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Abstract
This paper describes the strategies used by
AstonCAT-Plus, the post-tournament version of
the specialist designed for the TAC Market De-
sign Tournament 2010. It details how AstonCAT-
Plus accepts shouts, clears market, sets transaction
prices and charges fees. Through empirical evalu-
ation, we show that AstonCAT-Plus not only out-
performs AstonCAT (tournament version) signif-
icantly but also achieves the second best overall
score against some top entrants of the competition.
In particular, it achieves the highest allocative efﬁ-
ciency, transaction success rate and average trader
proﬁt among all the specialists in our controlled ex-
periments.
1 Introduction
Double Auction (DA) market is a market in which multiple
buyers compete to purchase many items that are simultane-
ously offered for sale by multiple sellers [He et al., 2003].
This mechanism has dominated today’s ﬁnancial instruments
exchange for its high allocative efﬁciency and simplicity
in implementation. As economy and technologies evolve,
the burgeoning online trading system and electronic market-
places have offered traders more freedom than ever to trade
their securities across the world. Given this, one DA market
has to face competitions from other similar markets running
concurrently around the world.
In order to explore automated mechanism design, the In-
ternational Trading Agent Competition (TAC) market design
tournament (also called CAT) simulates the competitive en-
vironment of multiple double auction markets. Entrants of
the competition called specialists need to design their own
strategies for the following policies [Cai et al., 2009]: clear-
ing policy deciding how to match traders’ offers and when to
execute transactions; pricing policy calculating transactional
prices; accepting policy judging what offers can be placed in
the market; and charging policy determining what are appro-
priate fees. Another principal entity in CAT is the trader who
may be either a buyer or seller willing to exchange goods.
Traders are provided by the organiser and equipped with a
trading strategy selected from four most studied ones: ZI,
ZIP, GD, RE [Gode and Sunder, 1993; Cliff and Bruten, 1997;
Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Nicolaisen et al., 2001] and a
market selection strategy which is mainly based on the history
of the trader’s proﬁt made with each specialist.
A CAT game lasts a number of days (500 days in CAT-
2010). Each day consists of a number of trading rounds,
which each lasts for a known constant length of time. The
daily evaluation of the specialists is based on three metrics:
(1) market share, which is the percentage of the total traders’
population registered in the market; (2) proﬁt share, which is
the ratio of the daily proﬁt a specialist obtains to the proﬁt of
all specialists and (3) transaction success rate (TSR), which
is the percentage of the shouts accepted that result in transac-
tions. The daily score of each specialist is the mean value of
the above three metrics [Cai et al., 2009].
AstonCAT is a specialist designed for the CAT tourna-
ment. Inspired by its soaring improvement in performance
on Day 3 of the competition (ranked 5th), we developed
post-tournament version called AstonCAT-Plus which signif-
icantly outperforms its predecessor and achieves the highest
TSR, allocative efﬁciency and average trader proﬁt among all
the specialists in controlled experiments. Our main contri-
butions are: (1) We develop a new and effective equilibrium
estimation algorithm reﬂecting both long-term and short-term
market conditions. (2) We introduce intra-day shifting thresh-
old shout accepting strategy. (3) We propose for the ﬁrst time
a clearing strategy which clears market based on proﬁt tar-
get. (4) Our hierarchical market-adaptive charging strategy
successfully solves the trade-off between maintaining a rea-
sonably high market share and generating proﬁt.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents the details of AstonCAT-Plus. Section 3 evaluates it
through controlled experiments. Section 4 concludes.
2 AstonCAT-Plus
Figure 1 shows the architecture of AstonCAT-Plus. The
strategies corresponds to the four policies mentioned in Sec-
tion 1. Shout engine registers, sorts and classiﬁes accepted
shouts. It couples tightly with clearing strategy to determine
which bids match which asks. Auctioneer acts as a coordi-
nator assembling and passing information requested by other
components. Market client deals with communication issues
with the CAT server. Finally, market equilibrium estimator
generates estimated current equilibrium price pˆ∗ which is re-
ferred to by clearing, accepting and pricing strategies.
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Figure 1: AstonCAT-Plus architecture.
2.1 AstonCAT-Plus Equilibrium Estimation
According to micro-economy theory [Perloff, 1998], in order
to efﬁciently allocate goods and fairly price transactions in a
market, it is indispensable to estimate equilibrium price p∗ of
the market. We estimate p∗ through running sliding windows
on two independent streams of market information. One is
run over the history of transaction prices to ﬁnd short-term
equilibrium price ps and the other over the averages of daily
maximum transacted asks and the minimum transacted bids
to ﬁnd long-term equilibrium price pl. ps uses a higher weight
for more recent transactions over a short window (typically 5)
since ps is supposed to be reactive to the instant changes of
market conditions. Let the last executed transaction be the
kth transaction of the game, ps is calculated as follows,
ps =
k∑
j=k−Wshort+1
pjtωj (1)
where
ωj =
0.9k−j
∑k
j=k−Wshort+1 0.9
k−j , (k −Wshort < j ≤ k)
(2)
pjt denotes the price of jth transaction and Wshort is the size
of the sliding window. To obtain pl, the history of the maxi-
mum transacted ask a and minimum transacted bid b is main-
tained and the method described in [Honari et al., 2009] is
used. Moreover, pl uses equal weight on every element over
a relatively long window (typically 20) such that it reﬂects a
long-term shifting tendency of our equilibrium price. Assum-
ing day z’s “DAYCLOSED” event has just occurred, pl can
be obtained by,
pl =
1
2Wlong
z∑
i=z−Wlong+1
(ai + bi), (z ≥ Wlong) (3)
where Wlong denotes the sliding window size and when
z < Wlong, z itself is used as window size. Once pl value
is established, it will be used for the next trading day.
Hence, we can see that ps contains only a few transactions’
information and gets updated dozens of times a day whereas
pl reﬂects several days’ information and gets updated only
once a day. By combining ps and pl, we have
pˆ∗ = psωs + pl(1− ωs), (4)
Figure 2: General structure of AstonCAT-Plus’s accepting
strategy. Shaded areas are accepting ranges. The arrows
pointing to the equilibrium price line indicate directions by
which accepting thresholds shift during a day.
where ωs is the weight of ps and the weight of pl is (1−ωs).
According to experiments, the best ωs is chosen to be 0.3.
As shown by Table 4 (see Section 3.4), our transaction
prices, which are normally our estimated equilibrium prices
according to our pricing strategy, deviate from the theoreti-
cal ones by a small margin of 6.205 (6.28% of p∗). More-
over, AstonCAT-Plus achieves the highest allocative efﬁ-
ciency meaning that our traders retain 95.76% of the maxi-
mum proﬁt that they can possibly get. Therefore, Formular 4
is effective for estimating market equilibrium.
2.2 Pricing Strategy
Our pricing policy simply sets transaction prices to pˆ∗ if pˆ∗
lies inside the bid-ask spread because p∗ represents where
demand trades off supply. In the case that pˆ∗ lies out-
side the spread, transaction price is set to the bid or ask
price whichever is closer to pˆ∗ to prevent negative trans-
actional proﬁt1. Comparing with side-biased pricing policy
[Vytelingum et al., 2008], ours effectively rewards the intra-
marginal side in a transaction rather than the side with less
population because short in number does not change an extra-
marginal trader to an intra-marginal one in CAT environment.
2.3 Shout Accepting Strategy
Shout accepting strategy decides whether a shout can be
placed in our market. Our accepting thresholds are set around
pˆ∗ (see Figure 2). Firstly, due to the fact that the esti-
mated equilibrium cannot be 100% accurate such that some
slack can avoid intra-marginal shouts being wrongly rejected.
More importantly, even pˆ∗ is accurate, tolerance is still nec-
essary because intra-marginal traders tend to attempt extra-
marginal shouts in order to gain a higher proﬁt.
To this end, we set pˆ∗(1 + α) and pˆ∗(1 − α) as ask and
bid thresholds respectively, where α, named slack rate, deter-
mines the degree of openness of the accepting policy. A small
α will result in fewer accepted shouts and consequently less
transactions than it should be. On the other hand, a large α
will result in excess extra-marginal shouts and unfair match-
ing between extra-marginal shouts and intra-marginal ones.
Moreover, a too-open policy would reduce TSR due to lots
of unmatchable shouts [Vytelingum et al., 2008]. To solve
this trade-off, we decrease α with transactions such that the
more the transactions, the tighter the thresholds become. At
1Transactional proﬁt is deﬁned as proﬁt generated by the differ-
ence between bid and ask prices.
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the beginning of each day, a large α can encourage shout sub-
missions, which is important for maintaining market share.
As transactions are executed, intra-marginal shouts (goods)
are consumed which reduces the probability of new shouts
being submitted by intra-marginal traders and extra-marginal
shouts being matched. Therefore, a decreasing α can effec-
tively block unmatchable shouts from extra-marginal traders
and improve TSR. As a result, AstonCAT-Plus is not only at-
tractive to traders (2nd best in market share) but also achieves
the highest TSR in heterogeneous games of the controlled ex-
periments (see Section 3.2).
An appropriate initial α is found via experiments between
0.15 and 0.35. Because seller and buyer quantities are usually
not exactly symmetric, a bias to the side that is inadequately
represented would give the fewer side more freedom and re-
sult in more balanced ask and bid proﬁle. Let α0,a denote
initial slack rate for sellers and α0,b for buyers respectively.
α0,a and α0,b are updated daily as follows:
α0,a = α0
(nb+ns)
2 + (β − 1)ns
βns
(5)
α0,b = α0
(nb+ns)
2 + (β − 1)nb
βnb
(6)
Where
(nb+ns)
2 +(β−1)ns
βns
and
(nb+ns)
2 +(β−1)nb
βnb
are bias ratios.
ns and nb are the average number of sellers and buyers over
last 5 days respectively. β ∈ [2, 5] is used to ﬂatten the re-
sult such that the output will not be absurdly far from 1 even
if there is a large difference in quantity between buyer and
seller. During a day, α0,a and α0,b are deducted by a small
value  on every transaction until ask ratio ra and bid ratio rb
reach their pre-deﬁned limit la = 1.05 and lb = 0.95. Finally
the ask and bid accepting thresholds τa and τb are,
τa = pˆ
∗(max(1 + (α0,a − nt), la)) (7)
τb = pˆ
∗(min(1− (α0,b − nt), lb)) (8)
where nt is the number of transactions happened in a trading
day by the time of the calculation.
2.4 Market Clearing Strategy
While shout accepting strategy decides which shouts to be
accepted, market clearing strategy decides how to match the
accepted shouts and when to convert matches into transac-
tions. AstonCAT-Plus’s clearing strategy is a combination
of Continuous Double Auction2 (CDA) and our innovative
proﬁt per transaction (PPT) based clearing mechanism. Our
PPT-based clearing scheme is designed to promote traders’
proﬁt. The idea behind it is: under certain conditions, we
postpone transactions such that matched pairs within the
same set of shouts can be reselected to prevent low-proﬁt or
extra-marginal transactions. Statistically, more than 70% of
new shouts are submitted during ﬁrst 3 rounds. Therefore,
we use PPT-based clearing mechanism during this period to
offer intra-marginal traders sufﬁcient oppotunities to make
their deserved proﬁt. Responding to the change of market
2Trade takes place as soon as there is a matchable pair of bid and
ask offers in the market.
1. IF “SHOUTPLACED” event occurs THEN
2. shout engine sorts matched bid-ask pairs
3. IF round < 3 THEN /* clear market using PPT-based clearing scheme */
4. flag = true
5. calculate average PPT for matched bid-ask pairs
6. IF matched shouts contain extra-marginal ones THEN flag = false
7. IF flag = true AND average PPT > θs THEN trigger clearing
8. ELSE IF flag = false AND average PPT > θl THEN trigger clearing
9. ELSE IF matching volume > ntrader10nmarket THEN trigger clearing
10. ELSE trigger clearing /* clear market using CDA */
Figure 3: Pseudocode for AstonCAT-Plus market clearing policy.
conditions after 3 rounds such as reduced trading oppotuni-
ties, our clearing mechanism switches to CDA in order to
focus on boosting transaction quantity as CDA gives intra-
marginal traders the greatest chances to exchange their re-
maining goods within the time left.
Figure 3 illustrates our clearing mechanism. The shout en-
gine implements four-heap algorithm [Wurman et al., 1998].
ntrader is the total number of traders and nmarket is the to-
tal number of specialists. Two different minimum PPT lim-
its θl and θs are employed. Extra-marginal transactions3 do
not get executed unless their average transactional proﬁt is
larger than θl. θs is considerably smaller than θl such that
intra-marginal transactions have the priority to be cleared un-
less their proﬁt is too small. However, as matching volume
increases, we should not hold matches for too long even ei-
ther PPT target can be reached because quantity of transaction
must also be considered in order to maximise traders’s total
proﬁt in our market. Therefore, statement on line 9 in Figure
3 sets a point where matches are cleared regardless of PPT.
As for the values of θs and θl, we made them adaptive to per-
ceptible traders’ private value distribution. Assume that seller
(buyer) will not attempt an ask (bid) under (over) his private
value, highest attempted bid (bt) and lowest attempted ask
(at) over a number of days give an indication of trader’s pri-
vate distribution which conﬁne the maximum of transaction
proﬁt. Accordingly, θs and θl are set 2% and 16% of bt − at.
In our evaluation, specialists’ actual PPTs are compared to
show the effects of our clearing strategy (see Section 3.3).
2.5 Charging Strategy
The charging policy selects the type and the amount of the
fees that registered traders should pay to obtain market ser-
vices. AstonCAT-Plus only charges proﬁt fee so that our mar-
ket entry is free.
Our charging policy adapts fees according to our market
status evaluated from several dimensions. As Figure 4 shows,
our charging strategy consists of three hierarchical levels of
rules. Upper level rules dominate lower ones such that fee
updates ﬁred by lower level rules are constraint within a ra-
tional range and direction deﬁned by upper levels. Level-1
rules are set based on our current market share target comple-
tion which is a ratio between AstonCAT-Plus’s current trader
ncur and trader target ntar = number of tradersnumber of markets . Average
trader quantity of last 15 days is used as ncur. Level-1 func-
3An ask (bid) over (under) estimated equilibrium is identiﬁed
as extra-marginal shout and transactions involving extra-marginal
shouts are extra-marginal transactions.
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Figure 4: Hierarchical market-adaptive stabilized charging strategy.
tions to conﬁne fees to a rational range instead of updating
fees directly. Level-2 rules determines the direction of fee
modiﬁcation based on market trend which is identiﬁed us-
ing market trend ratio rt = ncuroverall mean of daily traders . If
rt > 1.16, “up” market trend is identiﬁed. If rt < 0.92,
“down” market trend is identiﬁed. In the case that market
trend cannot be detected, decision will be made by Level-3
which also determines step size of fee updates. The bench-
mark for setting Level-3 rules is called moving trend identi-
ﬁed by moving trend ratio rv which is weighted ncur with
higher weight for more recent days over ncur. rv > 1.06 in-
dicates “up” moving trend, rv < 0.97 indicates “down” mov-
ing trend, and 0.97 ≤ rv ≤ 1.006 indicates no moving trend.
Combining with decisions made by Level-2 rules, appropriate
updating step sizes are selected (see Figure 4). Based on this
charging strategy, our fees are rationally-conﬁned, market-
adaptive but stabilised against high volatility of market activ-
ities. Thus maintaining high market share and making high
proﬁt are well balanced.
3 Evaluation
This section analyses the performance of AstonCAT-Plus
through controlled experiments in a similar way to [Niu et
al., 2010] by which we attempt to relate market dynam-
ics to our adaptive auction rules. Seven specialist agents4
(see Table 1) are included in our experiments. Two types
of experiments are conducted: heterogeneous games (240
traders) and head-to-head games (120 traders). Traders are
uniformly distributed on the four provided trading strategies
(ZIP, RE, ZI-C and GD) for both games. In heterogeneous
games, AstonCAT-Plus competes with ﬁve opponent special-
ists developed by other institutes. In head-to-head games,
AstonCAT-Plus competes with only one specialist each time
which includes download agents and AstonCAT.
Our experiment setting is similar to that of CAT-2010 tour-
nament: 500 days and 10 rounds on each day. However, 10
iterations were run instead of 3 in order to obtain statisti-
4We mainly include CAT-2010 agents and the latest ver-
sion of known successful agents. All agents including As-
tonCAT and AstonCAT-Plus are available for download at
http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php
Figure 5: Score comparison for heterogeneous games.
Specialist Name Year Description
Mertacor 2010 Winner of CAT-2010
Jackaroo 2010 Runner-up of CAT-2010
TWBB 2010 5th in CAT-2010
PersianCAT 2008 Winner of CAT-2008
IAMwildCAT 2008 CAT-2008 Final
AstonCAT 2010 CAT-2010 Day 3 version, ranked the 5th
AstonCAT-Plus 2010 CAT-2010 Post-tournament version
Table 1: Specialists used in controlled experiments.
cally signiﬁcant results. For intra-game analysis, data of a
randomly selected representative game iteration are used.
3.1 Overall Performance
In heterogeneous games, AstonCAT-Plus achieves high per-
formance - ranked 2nd according to the overall scores (see
Figure 5). AstonCAT-Plus’s average overall score of 10 it-
erations is only 1.71% lower than Mertacor (winner of CAT-
2010) but 29.96% higher than the next best agent Jackaroo
(runner-up of CAT-2010). Statistically, AstonCAT-Plus’s lead
over other entrants is signiﬁcant due to a very small p value
(p value << 0.0001) in one tail paired t-test against each of
them. Speciﬁcally, from Figure 5 we can also see that mar-
ket share is a vital factor for the overall performance as the
rank of overall score is monotonically associated with market
share. Hence, maximising market share should undoubtedly
be the primary target for CAT specialist design. Mertacor and
AstonCAT-Plus together dominate the global market as sum
of their market share (56.63%) is considerably more than the
total of the other four specialists. Large market share also
helps AstonCAT-Plus and Mertacor make the most proﬁt al-
though their average proﬁt fee rate is just 4.15% which is far
lower than some other agents like PersianCAT (20%) which
make much less proﬁt. Apparently, a small amount of fee on
a large number of possible transactions after adequate market
is gained is the best way to maximise a specialist’s proﬁt.
3.2 Transaction Success Rate
AstonCAT-Plus achieves the highest TSR among all the spe-
cialists. As Table 2 shows, AstonCAT-Plus is the only spe-
cialist that gained a more than 90% average TSR throughout
heterogeneous games. From Table 2, we can also see that
AstonCAT-Plus and Jackaroo outperforms Mertacor by 4.1%
and 6.2% respectively in terms of TSR. However, AstonCAT-
Plus’s TSR is far more stable than Jackaroo as its standard de-
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Figure 6: Average trader proﬁt per transaction.
Table 2: TSR summary for heterogeneous games
viation (0.0108) is less than half of that of Jackaroo (0.028).
We attribute the success to our shifting threshold accept-
ing strategy which ensures that unmatchable extra-marginal
shouts submitted by extra-marginal traders can be blocked
outside our market effectively as trading progresses.
3.3 Average Trader Proﬁt
This subsection analyses the effects of our clearing strategy
by comparing average trader proﬁt of each specialist. Since a
trader’s average proﬁt is determined by the average proﬁt per
transaction (PPT) and the average number of transactions per
trader (TPT), we will look into these two factors in turn.
Figure 6 shows AstonCAT-Plus maintains a prominent ad-
vantage in terms of PPT. Although AstonCAT-Plus’s aver-
age market share falls behind Mertacor’s from day 210, our
full-game mean of PPT exceeds Mertacor by 9.94 (21.2% of
its mean). According to daily PPTs without averaging, only
Mertacor and AstonCAT-Plus’s daily PPT are stable with low
standard deviation (3.72 and 4.30 respectively). The others’
swing violently by a least standard deviation of 9.50. Accord-
ing to relative standard deviation to PPT mean (AstonCAT:
7.6%, Mertacor: 7.9%), AstonCAT-Plus achieves the highest
PPT with the lowest variance.
High PPT alone does not mean traders make good proﬁt
in a market if their average number of transactions per trader
(TPT) is small. At the start, everyone’s TPT is around 1.5.
But within a very short time, Mertacor and AstonCAT-Plus
establish their lead almost simultaneously. Figure 7 shows, at
the end of the game, traders with AstonCAT-Plus has traded
averagely 1.77 goods out of three total entitlements which
is 33.5%, 187.2%, 172.3%, 78.4% more than IAMwildCAT,
PersianCAT, TWBB, Jackaroo respectively, but only 1.6%
less than Mertacor. Our 2nd best TPT is mainly due to the
clearing strategy that encourages intra-marginal transactions
using smaller PPT threshold and switches to CDA at the right
time.
Ultimately, PPT×TPT2 gives us average trader proﬁt.
Figure 7: Average transaction (goods traded) per trader.
AstonCAT-Plus’s average trader proﬁt (50.38) in this rep-
resentative game signiﬁcantly exceeds that of Mertacor,
IAMwildCAT, Jackaroo, PersianCAT and TWBB by 19%,
75%, 130%, 303% and 335%, respectively.
3.4 Efﬁciency and Convergence
Allocative efﬁciency and convergence coefﬁcient are two es-
sential metrics to identify whether a market is efﬁcient and
stable. According to [Cai et al., 2009], the allocative efﬁ-
ciency is deﬁned as the ratio of the trades’ actual proﬁt to the
theoretical maximum proﬁt (obtained had all traders traded at
the theoretical equilibrium according to microeconomic the-
ory), and the convergence coefﬁcient is deﬁned as standard
deviation of transaction prices around daily theoretical equi-
librium. According to the heterogeneous game results shown
in Table 4, Mertacor and AstonCAT-Plus’s efﬁciencies are
signiﬁcantly higher with signiﬁcantly smaller standard devia-
tion than other specialists, which means they are much more
efﬁcient and stable markets. AstonCAT-Plus is arguably more
efﬁcient than Mertacor not only because both our efﬁciency
mean and maximum are better than Mertacor, but also that we
keep our market in high efﬁciency considerably longer than
Mertacor. AstonCAT-Plus achieves “> 95%” allocative efﬁ-
ciency for 395 days (79% of the game length) versus 308 days
(62% of the game length) by Mertacor. Mainly we attribute
our high efﬁciency to our accepting and clearing strategies.
3.5 Head-to-Head Games
We have also run head-to-head games between AstonCAT-
Plus and each specialist from Table 1 and the results are gen-
erally consistent with heterogeneous games (see Table 3).
Mertacor is still the only specialist that scores better than
AstonCAT-Plus. Rather surprisingly, AstonCAT-Plus’s av-
erage overall score is a massive 240% of that of AstonCAT
which indicates the newer version successfully overcomes
certain vulnerable points of the original one.
In this situation, we are also interested in how traders mi-
grate and ﬁnally converge to one of the two markets. Figure 8
shows that market quickly converges to AstonCAT-Plus in the
games against PersianCAT, TWBB and IAMwildCAT, grad-
ually converges toward AstonCAT-Plus in the games against
AstonCAT and Jackaroo. In the game against Mertacor,
AstonCAT-Plus managed to hold an equilibrium of market
share where traders do not converge to either market.
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Opponent Overall Score Market Share TSR Efﬁciency %
IAMwildCAT 0.842 vs 0.402 0.774 vs 0.226 0.862 vs 0.869 93.02 vs 93.41
Mertacor 0.558 vs 0.659 0.462 vs 0.538 0.839 vs 0.824 92.08 vs 94.57
PersianCAT 0.757 vs 0.475 0.693 vs 0.307 0.908 vs 0.789 94.08 vs 70.29
TWBB 0.789 vs 0.470 0.750 vs 0.250 0.884 vs 0.893 94.05 vs 82.77
Jackaroo 0.681 vs 0.574 0.574 vs 0.426 0.836 vs 0.930 94.32 vs 92.85
AstonCAT 0.853 vs 0.356 0.663 vs 0.337 0.898 vs 0.730 94.11 vs 81.39
Table 3: Results of head-to-head games. Each repeated 10 times.
First values in each column refer to mean of AstonCAT-Plus and
second ones refer to means of the corresponding opponents.
Table 4: Summary of allocative efﬁciency and convergence coefﬁ-
cient in heterogeneous games.
4 Conclusion
This paper details the strategy used by market specialist
AstonCAT-Plus (post-tournament version for the TAC CAT).
Speciﬁcally, we provide the novel strategies for accept-
ing shouts, pricing transactions, clearing market and setting
fees. AstonCAT-Plus is evaluated empirically with Aston-
CAT (tournament version for CAT-2010) and other top en-
trants of the competition, in which it performs stably and
highly efﬁciently. Moreover, our mechanism has shownmany
adaptive features. For example, our clearing threshold adapts
to the number of transactions and PPT limits adapt to percep-
tible traders’ private value distributions. We believe some of
our original ideas described in the paper can be borrowed by
real world DA market designers.
As for future work, we will further improve our shout en-
gine algorithm to enable clearing decision to be made on each
individual bid-ask pair rather than the matched shouts bunch.
Furthermore, most of our parameters are determined through
experiments at the moment. We are going to design an evolu-
tionary approach to learn optimal values for selected param-
eters through repeated games. By doing so, we believe the
reusability of our mechanism can be improved too.
References
[Cai et al., 2009] K. Cai, E. Gerding, P. McBurney, J. Niu,
S. Parsons, and S. Phelps. Overview of CAT: A market
design competition version 2.0. Technical Report ULCS-
09-005, University of Liverpool, UK, 2009.
[Cliff and Bruten, 1997] D. Cliff and J. Bruten. Minimal-
intelligence agents for bargaining behaviors in market-
based environments. Tech Report HPL-97-91, 1997.
[Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998] S. Gjerstad and J. Dickhaut.
Price formation in double auctions. Games and Economic
Behavior, 22, pages 1–29, 1998.
[Gode and Sunder, 1993] D. Gode and S. Sunder. Allocative
efﬁciency of markets with zero-intelligence traders: Mar-
Figure 8: Daily market shares in head-to-head games.
ket as a partial substitute for individual rationality. Journal
of Political Economy, 101(1), pages 119–137, 1993.
[He et al., 2003] M. He, H. Leung, and N. R. Jennings. A
fuzzy-logic based bidding strategy for autonomous agents
in continuous double auctions. IEEE Transactions on
knowledge and data engineering, 15(6), pages 1345–1363,
2003.
[Honari et al., 2009] S. Honari, M. Ebadi, A. Foshati,
M. Gomrokchi, J. Benatahr, and B. Khosravifar. Price es-
timation of PersianCAT market equilibrium. Association
for the Advancement of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 2009.
[Nicolaisen et al., 2001] J. Nicolaisen, V. Petrov, and L. Tes-
fatsion. Market power and efﬁciency in a computational
electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pric-
ing. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
5(5), pages 504–523, 2001.
[Niu et al., 2010] J. Niu, K. Cai, S. Parsons, P. McBurney,
and E. Gerding. What the 2007 tac market design game
tells us about effective auction mechanisms. Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. Special Issue on Market-
Based Control of Complex Computational Systems, 2010.
[Perloff, 1998] J.M. Perloff. Microeconomics, chapter 2,
pages 29–32. 1998.
[Vytelingum et al., 2008] P. Vytelingum, I. A. Vetsikas,
B. Shi, and N. R. Jennings. IAMwildCAT: The Winning
Strategy for the TAC Market Design Competition. In Pro-
ceedings of 18th ECAI, pages 428–432, 2008.
[Wurman et al., 1998] P. R. Wurman, W. E. Walsh, and M. P.
Wellman. Flexible double auctions for electronic com-
merce: theory and implementation. Decision Support Sys-
tems 24(1), pages 17–27, 1998.
151
